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1. Introduction 
In §8 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(RFM), Appendix 3 Wittgenstein imagines what 
conclusions would have to be drawn if the Gödel formula P 
or ¬P would be derivable in PM. In this case, he says, one 
has to conclude that the interpretation of P as “P is 
unprovable” must be given up. This “notorious paragraph” 
has heated up a debate on whether the point Wittgenstein 
has to make is one of “great philosophical interest” 
revealing “remarkable insight” in Gödel’s proof, as Floyd 
and Putnam suggest (Floyd (2000), Floyd (2001)), or 
whether this remark reveals Wittgenstein’s 
misunderstanding of Gödel’s proof as Rodych and Steiner 
argued for recently (Rodych (1999, 2002, 2003), Steiner 
(2001)). In the following the arguments of both 
interpretations will be sketched and some deficiencies will 
be identified. Afterwards a detailed reconstruction of 
Wittgenstein’s argument will be offered. It will be seen that 
Wittgenstein’s argumentation is meant to be a rejection of 
Gödel’s proof but that it cannot satisfy this pretension. 
The notorious paragraph runs as follows (the last 
three sentences are omitted and will not be discussed in 
this paper): 
I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have 
constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to designate it) in 
Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain definitions 
and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says 
‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. Must I not say 
that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the 
other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; 
then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot 
be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that is not 
provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.” 
Just as we ask, “‘Provable’ in what system?”, so we 
must also ask, “‘true’ in what system?” ‘True in Russell’s 
system’ means, as was said: proved in Russell’s system; 
and ‘false in Russell’s system’ means: the opposite has 
been proved in Russell’s system. – Now what does your 
“suppose it is false” mean? In the Russell sense it 
means ‘suppose the opposite is proved in Russell’s 
system’; if that is your assumption you will now 
presumably give up the interpretation that it is 
unprovable. And by ‘this interpretation’ I understand the 
translation into this English sentence. – If you assume 
that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that 
means it is true in the Russell sense, and the 
interpretation “P is not provable” again has to be given 
up.[…] 
2. The Floyd-Putnam interpretation: 
Wittgenstein’s “remarkable insight” 
While the first commentators such as Kreisel (1958) and 
Bernays (1959) were rather shocked by Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on Gödel in the 1956 published RFM and 
concluded that Wittgenstein failed to appreciate the 
consistency assumption of Gödel’s proof, Floyd argued in 
her papers 2000 (with Putnam) and 2001 contrary to 
Kreisel and Bernays that Wittgenstein’s argumentation is 
based on Gödel’s assumption of ω-consistency. Relying on 
the above quoted §8 Floyd and Putnam attribute to 
Wittgenstein a “philosophical claim of great interest”, 
namely that “if one assumes […] that ¬P is provable in 
Russell’s system one should […] give up the ‘translation’ of 
P by the English sentence ‘P is not provable’” (Floyd 
(2000), p. 625). According to Floyd and Putnam this claim 
is grounded in Wittgenstein’s acceptance of Gödel’s 
mathematical proof showing that PM must be ω-
inconsistent, if ¬P is provable. From this it follows that the 
predicates ‘NaturalNo(x)’ and ‘Proof(x,t)’ occurring in P 
cannot be interpreted as ‘x is a natural number’ and ‘x is 
the number of a proof of the formula with the number t’ 
because one has to allow for non-standard interpretations 
of the variable’s values being other than numbers. This 
interpretation is joined by the claim that Wittgenstein’s “aim 
is not to refute the Gödel theorem”, “for nothing in that 
proof turns on any such translation into ordinary language” 
(Floyd (2000), p. 625f). According to Floyd and Putnam 
Wittgenstein himself is just stating what Gödel holds if the 
latter insists that his proof is independent of any 
interpretation and rests on consistency assumptions.  
Depart from the question of the “philosophical 
interest” of the position Floyd and Putnam attribute to 
Wittgenstein, the sympathetic point of their interpretation 
seemed to be the possibility to find a way of interpreting 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel without the need of 
accusing him to misunderstand the great mathematician. 
However, depart from the fact that they cannot quote direct 
textual evidence for their interpretation, two main reasons 
speak against it: First of all, it cannot be ignored that 
Wittgenstein does not agree with Gödel’s argument, to 
mention only some evidence: he calls the “Gödelian 
reason” a “stupid one”, that is “obviously nonsensical” 
(MS121, 81v), similar to paradoxes he sees in Gödel’s 
argument a “profitless performance” (RFM, App.3, §12) 
and “bits of legerdemain” (RFM, App.3, §19), he questions 
to call Gödel’s proof a “forcible reason” for giving up the 
search of a proof (RFM, App.3, §14f.). Secondly, what 
Wittgenstein says in §8 is not in harmony with Gödel’s 
argument. Wittgenstein presumes that “P is true in 
Russell’s sense” means “P is provable in Russell’s system” 
and “P is false in Russell’s sense” means “¬P is provable 
in Russell’s system” – these assumptions Gödel would not 
affirm but claim to have disproved by his incompleteness 
proof. And he (Wittgenstein) maintains that due to the 
derivation of a contraction from both of the assumptions – 
that ¬P is provable and that P is provable – one will follow 
that the interpretation of P as “P is unprovable” has to be 
given up. Yet, Gödel in his proof shows that assuming the 
provability of P it would follow that PM is ω-inconsistent 
and assuming P it would follow that PM is inconsistent and 
from this he draws the conclusion that these assumptions 
and not any interpretation have to be given up. Whatever 
the exact meaning of Wittgenstein’s argumentation in §8 
is, to try to harmony it with Gödel’s view does not justice to 
both – Wittgenstein and Gödel. Actually, Gödel rejected 
Wittgenstein’s argumentation accusing him to confuse his 
argumentation with “a kind of logical paradox” (cf. Wang 
(1987), p. 49).  
According to Floyd and Putnam, Wittgenstein’s 
“remarkable insight” culminates in “a philosophical claim of 
great interest”, namely that Gödel does not prove the truth 
of P, because this would presuppose the acceptance of 





the translation of P which is in question because the 
consistency of Russell’s system PM cannot be proven. 
Even Rodych (1999), p. 188ff. makes a similar claim 
according to his interpretation of §14f.and RFM, VII 22. 
Unfortunately, Floyd, Putnam and Rodych do not explain 
why the triviality that Gödel’s proof including the claim that 
P is true rests on the assumption of consistency of PM is a 
“philosophical claim of great interest”. They leave it an 
open question what the significant difference consists in 
whether one says that Gödel proved the undecidability and 
truth of P, given the consistency of PM, or one insists that 
Gödel did not prove the truth of P because the consistency 
of PM is not proven. Thus, if one does not trace 
Wittgenstein’s remark on Gödel back to a 
misunderstanding all what one can make out of them is a 
repetition of the fact that Gödel’s proof rests on the 
unproven assumption of consistency as Gödel stressed 
himself. 
3. The Rodych-Steiner interpretation: 
Wittgenstein’s mistake 
According to Rodych and Steiner §8 cannot be interpreted 
without accusing Wittgenstein to misunderstand Gödel’s 
argumentation. To both of them Wittgenstein mistakenly 
assumes that Gödel’s proof rests on a natural language 
interpretation, whereas the pure mathematical part proving 
the undecidability of either P or ¬P does not presume any 
interpretation of P. As will be seen, evidence can be put 
forward for this claim. Yet, whereas Steiner does not at all 
argue for it by examining §8, Rodych (1999) does offer a 
detailed analysis of §8, yet not a wholly convincing one. In 
Rodych (1999), p.182 Wittgenstein’s mistake is explained 
in the following way:  
Thus, when Wittgenstein says in §8 “if that [i.e. 
“‘suppose ‘P’ is false’ means ‘suppose the opposite is 
proved in Russell’s system’”] is your assumption”, the 
obvious and immediate Gödelian reply is: “Well, yes I 
would ‘now presumably give up the interpretation that it 
is unprovable’ if that were my assumption – but it isn’t – 
it’s your assumption”.  
The parenthesis is by Rodych and interprets the 
reference of “that” wrongly: The demonstrative pronoun 
does not refer to Wittgenstein’s interpretation of “P is false” 
in the sense of “¬P is proved in Russell’s system”, but only 
to the assumption “¬P is proved in Russell’s system” – this 
is the assumption directly mentioned before. Wittgenstein 
maintains in §8 that this assumption will compel one to 
give up the interpretation of P as “P is unprovable”. To this, 
the obvious and immediate Gödelian reply would not be, 
as Rodych maintains, that one would give up the 
interpretation of P as “P is unprovable”, whether this 
assumption is only Wittgenstein’s or not. The immediate 
Gödelian reply would rather be: Given this assumption, it 
follows by applying purely recursive definitions, an ω-
inconsistency, and that is why I actually do give up this 
assumption! Thus, a Gödelian needs not to accept 
Wittgenstein’s argumentation and draw the consequence 
that P shall not be interpreted as “P is unprovable”. 
Though not needed in order to derive the undecidability of 
P in PM, as will be seen in the next section, this 
interpretation is needed in order to prove the 
incompleteness of P. Thus from a Gödelian point of view 
one should not concede Wittgenstein’s argumentation and 
assume the provability of ¬P while giving up the 
interpretation of P as “P is unprovable”.  
To sum up, in order to evaluate the validity of 
Wittgenstein’s argument a thoroughly reconstruction of it 
and a comparison to Gödel’s way of argumentation is 
needed. This will be done in the following section, by 
examining sentence for sentence of the above quoted §8. 
4. Reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s 
argument 
§8 opens by presuming that “by means of certain 
definitions and transformations” P can be interpreted by “P 
is not provable in Russell’s system”. Let’s abbreviate this 
assumption by 
P = ¬Π P 
In the following of the first paragraph an argument is 
given for the thesis that P is true and unprovable by 
reducing the negation of both conjuncts of this thesis to 
absurdity. First of all from ¬P a contradiction is derived 
(sentence 3 and 4). In order to do so, in addition to the 
assumption P = ¬Π P the assumption Π A → A, i.e. the 
correctness of PM, has to be introduced. The reductio of 
¬P can be reconstructed in the following way: 
1*    (1)  ¬P          A 
2    (2)  P = ¬ΠP      A 
1*,2  (3)  ¬¬ΠP        2,1=E 
1*,2  (4)  ΠP         3 DNE 
5    (5)  ΠA → A      A 
5    (6)  ΠP → P      5 SUB 
1*,2,5 (7)  P          6,4 MPP 
1*,2,5 (8)  P & ¬P       7,1 &I 
2,5   (9)  ¬¬P         1,8 RAA 
2,5   (10) P          9 DNE 
In the last but one sentence of paragraph 1 
Wittgenstein hints at the reductio of the second conjunct of 
the thesis that P is true and unprovable (i.e. P & ¬ΠP). In 
detail, the argumentation runs as follows: 
1*    (1)  ΠP         A 
2    (2)  P = ¬ΠP      A 
1*,2  (3)  Π¬ΠP       2,1=E 
4    (4)  ΠA → A      A 
4    (5)  Π¬Π P  → ¬ΠP 4 SUB 
1*,2,4 (6)  ¬ΠP         5,3 MPP 
1*,2,4 (7)  ΠP & ¬ΠP     1,6&I 
2,4   (8)  ¬ΠP         1,7 RAA 
The last sentence of the first paragraph of §8 entails 
the conclusio of this argumentation, i.e. the conjunction of 
both arguments: P & ¬ΠP.  
A similar, though not identical proof sketch is given 
by Wittgenstein in MS 117, pp.147-148. Of course, this 
way of understanding Gödel’s proof, is mistaken. First of 
all, Gödel never starts by assuming the truth or falsity of P, 
even not in his introductory remarks of Gödel (1931).  
 





Instead, Gödel always gives a reductio of the 
provability of P and the provability of ¬P. Secondly, his 
reductio, as conveyed in his formal proof following his 
introduction does not entail the “interpretation assumption” 
P = ¬Π P. Instead, he is relying on purely recursive 
definitions (in short: DEF.). Presupposing Rosser’s 
improvement of Gödel’s proof that allows one to dispense 
with the concept of ω-inconsistency these definitions allow 
one to construct a proof for P given a proof for ¬P and vice 
versa. The “interpretation assumption” is only needed in 
order to conclude from the undecidability of P (i.e. from 
¬ΠP & ¬Π¬P) the incompleteness of PM (i.e. P & ¬ΠP). 
Thus, in order to compare Gödel’s way of arguing, his 
proof can be put in the following form: Given ΠP one yields 
only by applying DEF. a proof of ¬P, ergo Π¬P, ergo ΠP & 
Π¬P, presuming the consistency of PM, it follows by RAA 
¬ΠP; given Π¬P, it follows only by applying DEF. a proof 
of P, ergo ΠP, ergo ΠP & Π¬P, presuming the consistency 
of PM, it follows by RAA ¬Π¬P. Ergo ¬ΠP & ¬Π¬P (the 
“undecidability thesis”). Yet, given P = ¬ΠP (the 
“interpretation assumption”), P follows form the first 
conjunct of the undecidability thesis. Thus, Gödel’s proofs 
of the undecidability thesis is a mathematical proof in the 
sense that it is only relying on recursive definitions, yet his 
proof of the incompleteness of PM is based on the 
interpretation assumption. Because he wants to end up 
with the incompleteness of PM, a Gödelian is not willing to 
give up this assumption and even though he will not 
accept Wittgenstein’s reconstruction of the argument, he 
also will not be inclined to draw the consequence 
Wittgenstein wants him to draw in the second paragraph of 
§8, that now shall be examined further. 
Wittgenstein’s argument starts with the assumption, 
he elaborated in the §1-7: “truth” is - as “provability” - 
system-dependent; “true in Russell’s system” means 
“proved in Russell’s system”, “false in Russell’s system” 
means “the opposite has been proven in Russell’s system. 
Thus, one yields 
P = ΠP 
¬P = Π¬P 
Given this, he argues in the following, his opponent 
will not any more be inclined to draw the same 
consequences: Instead of reducing ¬P and ΠP to 
absurdity, his opponent will now come to understand that 
the “interpretation assumption” P = ¬ΠP has to be given 
up, because if he would still derive the thesis P & ¬ΠP this 
would be contradictory: According to ¬P = Π¬P this would 
amount to P & ¬P and according to P = ΠP this would 
amount to maintain ΠP & ¬ΠP. Thus, Wittgenstein’s 
argument is, that the reductio argumentation of his 
opponent are underdetermined and that by considering P 
= ΠP and ¬P = Π¬P the Gödelian will come to understand 
that not the assumption ¬P and Π¬P have to be reduced to 








This reasoning is mistaken because of the following 
reasons: 
1. Gödel does not agree with the assumptions 
Wittgenstein starts his argumentation in the second 
paragraph: Whether P = ΠP and ¬P = Π¬P are valid 
is just what is in question and the philosophical 
upshot of Gödel’s proof is to have proven that these 
assumptions are wrong. This, indeed, is in conflict 
with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Yet, Wittgenstein 
has to argue against the premises of Gödel’s proof 
(especially DEF. which itself strengthen the 
interpretation assumption), if he wants to stick to 
these assumptions. One cannot pertain to argue 
against the incompleteness proof by presupposing 
the falsehood of its conclusion. 
2. Gödel does not start his argument, by presuming ¬P 
and reducing it to absurdity: Instead, he only 
reduces Π¬P and ΠP to absurdity, thus putting 
forward the undecidability thesis ¬Π¬P & ¬ΠP. And 
this he does without assuming the interpretation 
assumption. Only his move from the undecidability 
thesis towards the incompleteness theorem 
presupposes the interpretation assumption without 
hereby using RAA. 
Conclusion 
According to any given interpretation, Wittgenstein’s 
notorious remark on Gödel cannot be appreciated as 
revealing a “remarkable insight” of “great philosophical 
interest”, because either it is understood as simply 
affirming what Gödel said or as a misguided critique of 
Gödel’s proof. Wittgenstein’s argumentation is no 
challenge for the Gödelian, yet Gödel’s argumentation is a 
challenge for the Wittgensteinian.  
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